In the Binance incident of 29 October 2026, the amount taken drew attention before the mechanism. The central technical issue concerns authority granted through valid signatures: a system can lose control of funds even when a transaction passes ordinary cryptographic checks.
This analysis compares Binance’s official statements checked on 9 November with TRM Labs and Blockaid research and the EIP-7702 specification. It separates company statements, analyst observations and investigative hypotheses; it is not an independent forensic investigation of the affected systems.
The available account of the attack
According to its 3 November report , the attack crossed several devices and internal AI tools before reaching the signing service, with fake interviews used during preparation. Binance puts the affected assets at $6.34 billion. Its report is preliminary and remains subject to independent review.
What the amounts describe
TRM Labs values transfers using asset prices at the time they occurred. Comparing amounts therefore requires matching observation times, prices and the transactions included. The amount stolen does not automatically equal users’ final losses: recoveries and resources used to replenish assets also matter.
EIP-7702 changes what an account can authorise
The EIP-7702 specification lets an externally owned account designate delegated code. An authorisation also contains a chain ID and nonce. Checking the signature is therefore only part of interpreting it: the delegated code and its consequences for the account matter too.
A delegation can persist beyond the transaction that set it. It is not immutable: another valid authorisation can replace it or clear the delegation code. Security assessment must consider later account states, not only the amount shown in the initial operation.
This explains the general risk of signing something that appears harmless. It does not by itself establish a vulnerability in the specification or prove that a particular Binance interface displayed incorrect information. The company’s account remains preliminary and does not allow independent verification of every internal step.
Reconstructing the signatures
Blockaid describes pre-signed authorisations covering a range of possible nonces while the wallet continued operating. A nonce is a protocol-checked counter: an authorisation with a mismatched value is skipped during that processing, rather than automatically activating when the counter advances. It may be submitted again when the value matches, if the other conditions remain valid.
Blockaid traces transfers concentrated into a few minutes. Their observable speed does not establish how long preparation took or independently explain how the signatures were obtained. A blockchain exposes transactions and delegations; it does not show internal procedures, approval screens or every interaction with a signing system.
The EIP-7702 step concerns Ethereum. It does not by itself explain transfers on the other blockchains, which the analyses describe as including ordinary signed transactions.
Attribution and root cause are separate questions
On 31 October, the FBI officially attributed the theft to North Korea , identifying the activity as TraderTraitor. The notice does not set out the complete compromise chain: identifying those responsible and reconstructing the technical entry point remain separate questions.
Distinguishing stolen keys from misuse of a signing system also needs care. Transactions with valid signatures fit more than one scenario. Treating one hypothesis as the definitive cause would give readers certainty that on-chain traces alone cannot provide.
Recovery updates
In its 4 November update , Binance says it has replenished about 98% of the affected assets, with less liquid tokens still being acquired. Replenishment using company resources is distinct from recovering stolen funds.
On 6 November , the company announced another phased reopening of withdrawals by asset and network. Check actual availability before making a transaction: the announcement does not establish that every withdrawal service has resumed.
Two different layers of protection
For a custodian, understandable authorisations, operational limits, separation of duties and checks on delegated code matter. These are architectural controls to verify in an implementation, not guarantees supplied by the name of a wallet or technology.
For a user, passkeys and controlled recovery address different risks. They do not alone stop compromise of a custodian’s infrastructure. Self-custody transfers responsibility and can introduce irreversible mistakes; it is not a universal solution either. Before deciding where to keep assets, understand who can authorise their movement and what happens when that control fails.
Sources
- North Korea Steals $6.36 Billion from Binance in the Largest Hack in History ↗ — TRM Labs · accessed 2026-11-09
- Binance incident analysis ↗ — Blockaid · accessed 2026-11-09
- EIP-7702: Set Code for EOAs ↗ — Ethereum Improvement Proposals · accessed 2026-11-09
- North Korea Responsible for $6 Billion+ Binance Attack ↗ — FBI · accessed 2026-11-09
- Initial findings (3 November) ↗ — Binance · accessed 2026-11-09
- Recovery Update #7 (4 November) ↗ — Binance · accessed 2026-11-09
- Recovery Update #9 (6 November) ↗ — Binance · accessed 2026-11-09


